Alternative plea in divorce? Not so fast!


When filing a complaint for divorce is that the typical philosophy of a lawyer, serving the standard philosophy is to make as much as possible is theoretically possible claims, relying on the Court or is opposed to a lawyer to take appropriate measures to paskarzhvannya weakest requirements; Strategy is often called "throw as much mud at the wall and see what sticks!" Pennsylvania rules of civil procedure (as. An RCP 1020 and 1021) seem to support such a strategy, in particular by allowing the alternative expression of the court, and requests the conflicting requirements. In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clearly ruled that "(t) regulations, Hesse reflect the general principle that claimants should not be forced to choose one or another theory during the lawsuit." Republic Intermodal Corporation and Sullivan Lines, Inc. against Doris Leasing Company, Inc. and Union National Bank of Pittsburgh, 473 m. 614 (1976).

When filing a complaint for divorce, most advocates support the above strategy, both before & # 39; expressing the requirements for divorce in accordance with Sections 3301 (c) 3301 (d), and sometimes 3301 (a) Pennsylvania Code of divorce, as a standard practice. For the benefit of those who are not familiar with the Code of divorce, section 3301 (c) allows no-fault divorce after the two sides on the consent agreement and ninety (90) days have passed since the filing of the divorce case. . Section 3301 (d) allows divorce in an unmistakable manner unilaterally to one spouse after two (2) years of separation. 3301 (a) – the traditional and old-fashioned demand a divorce based on fault.

Despite the fact that the civil proceedings, appears to allow an alternative petition, even in the face of divorce, a growing number of cases, which, in certain circumstances, prohibit the alternative request for divorce. There was one question: whether the plaintiff can in divorce, granting of Article 3301 (a) and 3301 (d) and / or 3301 (a) refuse to apply for consent to consent to their own divorce? According to the above rules and jurisprudence, it appears that the plaintiff in the case has an adjustable range of action, depending on what he would have wished. However, under certain circumstances, courts are increasingly restricted this right.

The large number of cases the Pennsylvania courts held that the refusal to allow the plaintiff's claim on the divorce to move in the near future the way, perhaps, unfair and improperly prevents the opposite direction. Thus, if the plaintiff brought under Article 3301 (a), the courts are increasingly taking the position that it is impossible to refuse an application for the agreement in accordance with section 3301 (c). the opposite side of the warning is very straightforward: firstly, filing a divorce case is often accompanied by submission (and provision) alimony pendente lite. Alimony pendente lite – is to support the other side, which can only be obtained in the course of a divorce in a divorce. Thus, the adoption of measures for the extension of one's own divorce action only serves to prolong the time that the other side has to pay alimony pendente lite, without having to stop. Secondly, it extends the marriage of the parties that may have any number of effects. The courts have taken the position that the refusal to consent to their own breeding marriage – is the abuse of the divorce process, and no one can benefit from the divorce, not taking reasonable steps to prompt its conclusion.

Despite the fact that the courts have ruled that it is impossible to deny the filing of the Acceptance if the court can compel a party to perform indications? Until now, the courts reluctantly forced to implement the consent agreement. In cases that address this issue today, the penalty for refusing to consent to a divorce own to make the dismissal of divorce in a shortened procedure, which, by definition, at the same time rejects alimony pendente lite. While it is unlikely that sanctions against a party that refuses to consent to their own swing of marriage, are among the punishments that are to be settled, but the cases do not provide such a result.

Set when the participant refuses to consent to a divorce increases if the participant receives suprugavaya support, not alimony pendente lite. The crucial difference between spousal support and to receive pendente lite is that the support of husband and wife does not depend on the claim for divorce. Spousal support, you can successfully apply for and receive from the husband and wife, which is absent in the process of a divorce, but finally concluded when the parties are divorced. Thus, the deviation of the claim for divorce as punishment for failure in the supply agreement of consent does not allow to regulate the ban on the presence of an artificially long marriage procedure in relation to the opposite side. In this case, judicial economy arguments are given in the context of the specific factual circumstances of each case. A particular problem is the deviation of an action for divorce a positive impact on the requirements for spousal support. If not, the dismissal of an action can not be an acceptable alternative to correct prejudices against the other side. It is in this situation, the sanctions are likely to be evaluated to correct obviously unfair situation.

Ultimately, when applying for a divorce you need to remember about the consequences of having the order for the support of spouses to maintenance on the speed with which we would like to continue the work on the dissolution of marriage. In addition, when one of the files under Section 3301 (a) of the Code of divorce, you must be ready to apply for consent, or should act only in accordance with other sections of the Code of divorce. Relevant cases on this subject: Skelly v. Skelly, 36 Pa. DC4th 189 (1997); Norris v. Norris, 10, of. D. & C.4th 207 (one thousand nine hundred ninety-one); Mellot against Melatha 1 Pa.D. & C.4th 618 (1988); Burk v. Burk, 38 Pa.D. & C.3d 558 (1986); Path against the path 35 Pa.D. & C.3d 653 (1985); Rueckert v. Rueckert, 20 Pa.D. & C.3d 191 (1981).


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